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ABSTRACT
Dueling-HMM Analysis on Masquerade Detection
by Peter Chou
Masquerade detection is the ability to detect attackers known as masqueraders that
intrude on another user’s system and pose as legitimate users. Once a masquerader obtains
access to a user’s system, the masquerader has free reign over whatever data is on that
system. In this research, we focus on masquerade detection and user classification using
the following two different approaches: the heavy hitter approach and 2 different approaches
based on hidden Markov models (HMMs), the dueling-HMM and threshold-HMM strategies.
The heavy hitter approach computes the frequent elements seen in the training data
sequence and test data sequence and computes the distance to see whether the test data
sequence is masqueraded or not. The results show very misleading classifications, suggesting
that the approach is not viable for masquerade detection.
A hidden Markov model is a tool for representing probability distributions over sequences
of observations [9]. Previous research has shown that using a threshold-based hidden Markov
model (HMM) approach is successful in a variety of categories: malware detection, intrusion
detection, pattern recognition, etc. We have verified that using a threshold-based HMM
approach produces high accuracy with low amounts of a false positives. Using the dueling-
HMM approach, which utilizes multiple training HMMs, we obtain an overall accuracy of
81.96%. With the introduction of the bias in the dueling-HMM approach, we produce similar
results to the results obtained in the threshold-based HMM approach, where we see many
non-masqueraded data detected, while many masqueraded data avoid detection, yet still
result in an high overall accuracy.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
A masquerader is an attacker that appears to be a normal user with valid authority and
privileges [20]. An attack from a masquerader is considered one of the most damaging attacks
in the field of computer security [20] [21] [22]. In order to accurately detect a masquerader,
we must be able to distinguish between users by observing the behaviors or patterns in which
a user issues a sequence of commands collected from his or her system.
The masquerade detection approach and user classification approach we use in this
research are the heavy hitter approach [1] and the dueling-HMM approach [23]. The heavy
hitter approach has been applied to mostly intrusion detections related to networks [24], so
we decided to see if the heavy hitter approach would be applicable to masquerade detection.
The heavy hitter approach utilizes the frequency in which a user has issued a command. By
computing the heavy hitters, aka most frequent elements, we get a list of the top k elements
from the training data sequence for a particular user. We associate this list of top k elements
to represent that particular user. We then compute the top k elements for the 100 test data
sequences associated to each user.
With the top k elements computed for the 100 test data sequences, we then use these
computed top k frequent elements to match the top k elements in the training sequence. The
results were unsatisfactory in that over 90% of the test cases would return less than 50%
match. Adding onto the heavy hitter approach, we use the Levenshtein distance approach to
compute the distance between the top k elements from the test sequence to the top k elements
from the training sequence. Further details about the Levenshtein distance approach is in
Chapter 3. Our test results show that many of the test sequences would be misclassified,
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though we do see an overall increase in accuracy by 30%. The results we obtained using
the heavy hitter approach was unsatisfactory, so we proceeded to experimenting with the
following two HMM-based approaches: threshold-based HMM and dueling-HMM.
Previous research has shown that using a threshold-based hidden Markov model (HMM)
approach is successful in a variety of categories: malware detection [28], intrusion detec-
tion [29], pattern recognition [9], etc. In this research, we verify that a threshold-based
HMM approach was able to capture most of the masquerade data.
The dueling-HMM approach utilizes multiple training HMMs to detect masqueraders
and classify users. For masquerade detection, each user would have two training HMMs, one
benign-only HMM and one masquerade-only HMM. We use an Estimater from the JAHMM
utils project [33] to compute the distance between the test data sequences and the two
training HMMs. We achieve an overall accuracy of 81% using the dueling-HMM approach.
To see if we could improve those results, we introduce a bias. With the introduction of a bias,
we are able to achieve 95% accuracy. For user classification, we use only the benign-only
training HMMs. So in total, we have 50 training HMMs, each representing a user, and use
only the non-masqueraded test sequences to see if this approach can correctly classify which
test sequence belongs to which user.
2
CHAPTER 2
Masquerade Detection Overview
2.1 Masquerade Detection
As the word masquerade implies, we are trying to detect whether a user is imperson-
ating another user. In sci-fi movies, we see spies wear masks of certain individuals to fool
facial recognition programs, or use the certain individuals handprint to fool hand recogni-
tion softwares. Impersonations come in many different forms: physical movements, gestures,
handwriting, voice, facial make-overs, etc.
Impersonation in the cyber world can occur when intruders successfully hack into an-
other user’s account and use his or her account to do whatever he or she wants. When an
email account gets hacked, we normally see that hacked account start spamming users in
that email accounts contact list. This spamming behavior is quite a clear indication that the
original account’s owner is being impersonated and used for some kind of attack.
Let’s consider the following scenario. We have an actual user, Bob, who is an engineer
who runs many Linux commands all day on his work system. An intruder, Joker, wants
to hack into Bob’s system and run all sorts of malware on Bob’s system without being
detected. Joker knows Bob runs thousands of commands a day, and tries to impersonate
Bob by running similar commands that Bob would use. If Joker manages to replicate Bob’s
behavior through the Linux commands Bob uses, then Joker has effectively been able to
masquerade as Bob. When that happens, we would have an extremely tough time trying to
distinguish whether Bob was the one who ran the different malware programs or whether
some intruder masqueraded as him and ran those malware softwares.
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2.2 Schonau Data Set
For this project, we use the Schonlau data set [4] to see how accurately the heavy
hitter approach and dueling-HMM approach would be able to classify users and perform
masquerade detection. We use the Schonlau data set because it has become the standard data
set for masquerade detection studies [5]. Figure 2 illustrates the structure of the Schonlau
data set.
The Schonlau data set consists of 50 text files, and each file corresponds to one user. Each
file consists of 15,000 commands that were collected using the UNIX audit tool. The first
5,000 commands capture the actual users’ behavior, which is intended to serve as our training
data. We consider this data as non-masqueraded data. The following 10,000 commands
include both non-masqueraded and masqueraded blocks of commands, which is intended to
serve as our test data. Each block consists of 100 lines of commands.
At any given block after the initial 5000 commands a masquerade starts with a
probability of 1%. If the previous block was a masquerade, the next block will
also be a masquerade with a probability of 80%. About 5% of the test data
contain masquerades" [4].
The Schonlau website already contains a text file that illustrates which blocks are mas-
queraded data for each user. The solutions file is in the format where each column corre-
sponds to a user, and each row corresponds to a test block. The value associated with each
test block is either 0 or 1. A zero implies that the block of data is non-masqueraded, and a
one implies that the block of data is masqueraded.
Through the survey article of Bertacchini and Fierens [2] and the article of Erbacher
et al. [7], we compiled a list of general approaches done on the Schonlau data set to detect
masqueraded data.
∙ Information-theoretic - This approach is based off the compression-based approach
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Figure 1: Schonlau Data Set Structure [5]
Figure 2: Schonlau Solution Set Structure [5]
that Schonlau et al. proposed called the compressionmethod [2]. The compress method
utilizes the compress UNIX command to compress data that either consists of the
same user or mixed users.
∙ Text mining - This approach is based off the sequitur algorithm [13], which extracts
hierarchical structures from a string by constructing a context-free grammar [13].
∙ Hidden Markov Model (HMM) - An HMM is defined as a doubly stochastic
process with an underlying process that is hidden [18]. The hidden stochastic process
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cannot be directly observed. It can only be observed through a process that produces
a sequence of observed symbols [18]. Past researchers have used the hidden Markov
model to construct user profiles and used it to score testing blocks by means of some
voting mechanism and a threshold value to determine the legitimacy of that testing
block.
∙ Naive Bayes - This approach is known for its inherent robustness to noise and its
fast learning curve [2]. It generally uses the "bag of words" model [16], which profiles
documents based on word frequencies and ignores the sequence information.
∙ Sequences Matching - This approach is commonly used to quantify the similarity
between two genetic sequences [2]. Schonlau’s use of this approach modeled after the
work of T. Lane and C. E. Brodley [17]. The sequence match approach measures the
ten most recent commands from the test data and a user’s profile by counting the
number of matches [17].
∙ Support vector machine (SVM) - The SVM approach utilizes a a set of machine
learning algorithms used for classification and regression [2].
∙ Uniqueness - As the name implies, this approach is based on the idea that commands
not previously seen in the training data may indicate an attempted masquerade [14].
In essence, the less frequent a command is used by users, the more that command is
seen as a masquerade.
∙ Hybrid Multi-Step Markov - This approach utilizes a multi-step Markov chain and
occasionally an independence model [15]. When a case such as the Markov model not
being usable when the test data contains many unobserved commands, the indepen-
dence model takes action and estimates the probabilities from a contingency table of
users versus commands.
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∙ Bayes one-step Markov - The Bayes one-step Markov goes further than the unique-
ness approach that only utilizes the command frequencies [14]. It is based on observing
the one-step transition probabilities from one command to the next command.
To our knowledge, neither the heavy hitters approach nor the dueling-HMM approach
have previously been studied in this domain. The following chapters discuss some background
information, implementation, tests, and results for the different approaches.
7
CHAPTER 3
Heavy Hitter
This chapter will discuss the implementation methods for the heavy hitter approach.
3.1 Heavy Hitter Background Information
"Heavy hitters" is the term used to refer to the most frequent (popular) elements in a
data stream while efficiently utilizing the space within the environment. Large sources of
data, such as streams of network packets, are usually best modeled as data streams. Data
streams are usually a large amount of data that is impractical and undesirable to store and
impractical and undesirable to process data exactly.
Heavy hitter is also referred to as the "Frequent Items Problem, where given a stream
of N items, find those that occur most frequently" [8]. The goal of finding the most frequent
items from a stream of data can help us in many different analysis cases: data mining [31],
network data analysis [24], bandwidth [32], etc.
Using the basis of finding frequent elements in a data stream, we use a heavy hitter
algorithm on the Schonlau data set to compute the heavy hitters for each user. These heavy
hitters are the top k elements, or most frequently seen commands, in the data sequence. We
associate heavy hitters computed from the training set as that particular user’s behavior and
see if we can determine whether we can detect masqueraded behavior from the test data.
There are a few popular heavy hitter algorithms, and they can be split into two cate-
gories: counter-based algorithms and sketch algorithms [8]. Counter-based algorithms solve
the problems in arrival-only models. Arrival only models are streams where data is be-
ing accumulated. Counter-based algorithms keep an individual counter for each element in
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a monitored set of elements. Sketch algorithms handle problems in arrival-and-departure
models where streams contain fluctuating data. Unlike the counter-based algorithms, sketch
algorithms do not have a monitored set of elements, but provide, with less stringent guaran-
tees, frequency estimation for all elements by using bit-maps of counters [1].
The Schonlau data set is a static data set and does not contain any fluctuating data, so
for this project, we use the counter-based algorithm that utilizes space saving.
3.2 Heavy Hitter Implementation
Through the use of the heavy hitter algorithm, we experiment to see if we can detect
masqueraded data by comparing and computing the top k elements of a user’s training data
sequence with the top k elements from the user’s test data sequences. Two experiments
were done using this approach, the space-saving algorithm and Levenshtein distance. We
implement the space-saving algorithm to compute the top k elements from the training data
sequence and the test data sequences in Java.
3.2.1 Space-saving Algorithm
The space-saving algorithm we use in this project follows the Stream-Summary data
structure approach discussed in the article of Metwally et al. [1]. The Stream-Summary
consists of buckets that contain a linked list of elements that have the same counter value.
In our implementation, our Stream-Summary is represented as a LinkedHashMap with the
counter value as the key, and the linked list of elements as the value.
Algorithm 1 displays the general steps of the space-saving algorithm used in this project,
which is based off of Metwally et al.’s algorithm [1]. What the space-saving algorithm does
is monitor the fast-growing elements in the data provided. This saves the space considerably
for large or would be infinite amounts of data. The parameter m is an integer that specifies
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how many elements to monitor.
Algorithm 1 Space-Saving (int m, String fileName)
begin
whi l e !EOF
c r ea t e an Element , e , with the value read in
i f e , i s monitored
// Checks the monitored l i s t o f e lements
// and updates the count o f the e x i s t i n g element
// in the l i s t
l e t count_i be the counter o f e
Increment−Counter ( count_i )
e l s e
// Replacement Step
i f s i z e o f monitored l i s t < m
Add element to the monitored l i s t
e l s e
Get the element with the l e a s t h i t , e_m,
from the monitored l i s t
Replace e_m with e
Increment−Counter (count_m)
end
Algorithm 2 displays the general steps of the Increment-Counter algorithm used in
this project. This is where we update the Stream-Summary by moving the Counters to
the Bucket with the correct Counter value. Figure 3 is a visual representation of how the
Stream-Summary works.
Figure 4 displays the flow diagram for the counter-based heavy hitter algorithm.
3.2.2 Levenshtein Distance
The Levenshtein distance is a metric for measuring how different two sequences are.
The distance between two sequences is defined as the minimum number of edits needed
to transform one sequence into the other through the following edit operations: insertion,
10
Algorithm 2 Increment-Counter (Counter 𝑐𝑖)
begin
i f Stream−Summary i s not Empty
Remove the c_i from the bucket i t i s cu r r en t l y in
i f the bucket_i i s empty
Detach bucket_i from the Stream−Summary
Delete bucket_i
i n c r e a s e the count o f c_i , count_i
i f bucket with new incremented count va lue e x i s t s
Attach c_i to the cor re spond ing bucket ’ s l i s t
e l s e
c r e a t e a new bucket
a s s i gn bucket_new the value o f count_i
Attach c_i to the new bucket
I n s e r t new bucket in to the Stream−Summary
end
Figure 3: Stream-Summary updates with m = 2 [1]
deletion, or substitution. For example, the Levenshtein distance between two strings, "bite"
and "hitting", is 5. The edits needed would be the following:
bite hitting (substitution of ’b’ with ’h’)
hite hitting (insert ’t’ after ’t’)
hitte hitting (substitution of ’e’ with i)
hitti hitting (insert ’n’ at the end)
hittin hitting (insert ’g’ at the end)
11
Figure 4: Counter-Based Flow Diagram
The first experiment used only the space-saving algorithm to compute the top k elements
and then determine whether a test data sequence was masqueraded or not by comparing how
many match the top k elements of that user. The second experiment utilized the Levenshtein
distance to compute the similarity between the top k elements obtained from the space-saving
algorithm to determine whether a test sequence is masqueraded or not.
3.3 Heavy Hitter Testing
With the heavy hitter approach, we split the Schonlau data set into two sets of data
for each user: a training set and a testing set. The training set contains the 5,000 lines of
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Linux commands that were classified as benign and the testing set contains the 10,000 lines
of Linux commands following the first 5,000 lines. We run our space-saving algorithm that
is implemented in Java to compute the top k heavy hitters from the training set. In order to
compute the top k heavy hitters in the testing set, we needed to further break the testing set
into sequences of 100 lines of Linux commands. We then compute the top k heavy hitters
for the 100 test sequences. To determine whether a test sequence is masqueraded or not, we
compare the two sets of top k heavy hitters and see how many from the test sequence match
the top k heavy hitters obtained from the training sequence.
The results from just comparing the union of the two sets of heavy hitters found from
the test sequences and training sequence produces a very low accuracy as seen in the Table 1,
Table 2, and Table 3 in Section 3.4. Building up on the heavy hitter approach, we explore
using the Levenshtein distance on the heavy hitters we computed to see if we can improve
the overall accuracy.
The Levenshtein distance in the example provided in Section 3.2.2 takes two strings
and computes the distance using the characters in each string. Instead of computing the
distances between two strings, we are using the Levenshtein distance to compute the distance
between two array of strings. Let’s look at an example below of two arrays of strings, testing
array and training array. The testing array contains: sh, ls, grep, mkdir, top. The training
array contains: sh, grep, ps, mkdir.
TEArray = Testing Array
TRArray = Training Array
Edit 1:
TEArray = [sh, ls, grep, mkdir, top]
TRArray = [sh, grep, ps, mkdir] (substitution of ’ls’ to ’grep’)
Edit 2:
TEArray = [sh, grep, grep, mkdir, top]
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TRArray = [sh, grep, ps, mkdir] (substitution of ’grep’ to ’ps’)
Edit 3:
TEArray = [sh, grep, ps, mkdir, top]
TRArray = [sh, grep, ps, mkdir] (deletion of ’top’)
Following the example above, we require 3 edits; therefore, the distance is 3. Using the
Levenshtein distance, we improve the overall accuracy to about 43.5% shown in Table 4 in
Section 3.4.
3.4 Heavy Hitter Results
We use the heavy hitter approach as is and try to improve upon the heavy hitter
approach using the Levenshtein distance. In the first experiment, we use the space-saving
algorithm to compute the top k elements and compare the top k elements of the test set and
top k elements of the training set and see if they match. The second experiment follows the
same procedure as the first experiment; however, instead of just comparing how many of the
top k elements matched, we use the Levenshtein distance algorithm to compute the distance
between the two arrays of top k heavy hitters from the training set and the testing sets to
generate our results.
3.4.1 Space-Saving Result
Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3 show the results of the heavy hitter space-saving approach
when we set the the algorithm to monitor the Top 3, 5, and 10 elements respectively. The
heavy hitter space-saving results table shown in this section displays the results of using a
threshold value that determines if the test was not masqueraded if the value of top k elements
in the testing data matched greater than 50% of the top k elements seen in the training data.
Table 1, which uses top 3 elements, produces the best overall accuracy of 19.34% out of
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the three different variations. It has the least amount of false alarms, False Positives (FP),
and also detected the least amount of masqueraded data, True Positive (TP); however,
detecting a higher amount of actual user behavior, True Negatives (TN). We see that only
the top 3 elements results misclassified masqueraded data, False Negatives (FN).
Table 1: HH - Top 3 Results
User Accuracy TP FP TN FN User Accuracy TP FP TN FN
User 1 30% 0 70 30 0 User 2 32% 3 68 29 0
User 3 39% 11 61 28 0 User 4 3% 2 97 1 0
User 5 0% 0 100 0 0 User 6 35% 0 65 35 0
User 7 13% 13 87 0 0 User 8 0% 0 100 0 0
User 9 37% 24 63 13 0 User 10 19% 13 81 6 0
User 11 2% 0 98 2 0 User 12 6% 6 94 0 0
User 13 5% 0 95 5 0 User 14 0% 0 100 0 0
User 15 7% 6 93 1 0 User 16 11% 10 89 1 0
User 17 36% 0 64 36 0 User 18 38% 6 62 32 0
User 19 53% 0 47 53 0 User 20 0% 0 100 0 0
User 21 8% 0 92 8 0 User 22 0% 0 100 0 0
User 23 1% 1 99 0 0 User 24 25% 21 75 4 0
User 25 9% 9 91 0 0 User 26 16% 11 82 5 2
User 27 1% 0 99 1 0 User 28 17% 3 83 14 0
User 29 3% 1 97 2 0 User 30 37% 3 63 34 0
User 31 1% 0 99 1 0 User 32 34% 0 66 34 0
User 33 19% 0 81 19 0 User 34 21% 12 79 9 0
User 35 75% 1 25 74 0 User 36 46% 6 54 40 0
User 37 26% 2 73 24 0 User 38 29% 7 69 22 2
User 39 11% 0 89 11 0 User 40 6% 0 94 6 0
User 41 8% 3 92 5 0 User 42 25% 20 75 5 0
User 43 35% 16 65 19 0 User 44 6% 6 94 0 0
User 45 30% 5 70 25 0 User 46 42% 4 58 38 0
User 47 39% 0 61 39 0 User 48 19% 2 81 17 0
User 49 4% 0 96 4 0 User 50 8% 0 92 8 0
Total 19.34% 227 4029 740 4
Summary: This table shows the results when we monitor the Top 3 Elements and set a threshold value
of 2 to determine whether a test is masqueraded or not. The overall accuracy is 19.34%.
Table 2, which uses top 5 elements, obtained the second best overall accuracy of 18.7%.
We see slightly higher amounts of False Positives than when we use the top 3 elements, which
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resulted in slightly lower overall accuracy.
Table 2: HH - Top 5 Results
User Accuracy TP FP TN FN User Accuracy TP FP TN FN
User 1 23% 0 77 23 0 User 2 51% 3 49 48 0
User 3 61% 11 39 50 0 User 4 3% 2 97 1 0
User 5 4% 0 96 4 0 User 6 15% 0 85 15 0
User 7 15% 13 85 2 0 User 8 0% 0 100 0 0
User 9 30% 24 70 6 0 User 10 27% 13 73 14 0
User 11 9% 0 91 9 0 User 12 6% 6 94 0 0
User 13 2% 0 98 2 0 User 14 0% 0 100 0 0
User 15 9% 6 91 3 0 User 16 11% 10 89 1 0
User 17 46% 0 54 46 0 User 18 12% 6 88 6 0
User 19 42% 0 58 42 0 User 20 0% 0 100 0 0
User 21 48% 0 52 48 0 User 22 2% 0 98 2 0
User 23 1% 1 99 0 0 User 24 22% 21 78 1 0
User 25 9% 9 91 0 0 User 26 15% 13 85 2 0
User 27 0% 0 100 0 0 User 28 15% 3 85 12 0
User 29 1% 1 92 0 0 User 30 34% 3 66 31 0
User 31 2% 0 98 2 0 User 32 36% 0 64 36 0
User 33 38% 0 62 38 0 User 34 15% 12 85 3 0
User 35 18% 1 82 17 0 User 36 35% 6 65 29 0
User 37 11% 2 89 9 0 User 38 22% 9 78 13 0
User 39 14% 0 86 14 0 User 40 5% 0 95 5 0
User 41 8% 3 92 5 0 User 42 22% 20 78 2 0
User 43 34% 16 66 18 0 User 44 13% 6 87 7 0
User 45 10% 5 90 5 0 User 46 47% 4 53 43 0
User 47 13% 0 87 13 0 User 48 27% 2 73 25 0
User 49 4% 0 96 4 0 User 50 5% 0 95 5 0
Total 17.84% 231 4108 661 0
Summary: This table shows the results when we monitor the Top 5 Elements and set a threshold value
of 3 to determine whether a test is masqueraded or not. The overall accuracy is 17.84%.
Lastly, Table 3, which uses top 10 elements, obtained the lowest overall accuracy of
2.96%. We used the threshold greater than 60%, so if a test block contains at least 6 out of
10 matches, we classify it as non-masqueraded. If we lowered the threshold value to 5 or less,
the overall accuracy would of course improve; however, if masqueraders only need to match
less than 50% of that user’s behavior, it would be all too easy for someone to masquerade
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as a user. Appendix A contains the table results for when we use top 10 elements with a
threshold of 2, 3, 4, and 5.
Table 3: HH - Top 10 Results
User Accuracy TP FP TN FN User Accuracy TP FP TN FN
User 1 8% 0 92 8 0 User 2 40% 3 60 37 0
User 3 30% 11 70 19 0 User 4 2% 2 98 0 0
User 5 4% 0 96 4 0 User 6 48% 0 52 48 0
User 7 13% 13 87 0 0 User 8 0% 0 100 0 0
User 9 26% 24 74 2 0 User 10 21% 13 79 8 0
User 11 5% 0 95 5 0 User 12 6% 6 94 0 0
User 13 0% 0 100 0 0 User 14 0% 0 100 0 0
User 15 6% 6 94 0 0 User 16 10% 10 90 0 0
User 17 49% 0 51 49 0 User 18 6% 6 94 0 0
User 19 47% 0 53 47 0 User 20 0% 0 100 0 0
User 21 34% 0 66 34 0 User 22 5% 0 95 5 0
User 23 1% 1 99 0 0 User 24 21% 21 79 0 0
User 25 9% 9 91 0 0 User 26 13% 13 87 0 0
User 27 0% 0 100 0 0 User 28 3% 3 97 0 0
User 29 1% 1 99 0 0 User 30 3% 3 97 0 0
User 31 1% 0 99 1 0 User 32 26% 0 74 26 0
User 33 31% 0 69 31 0 User 34 13% 12 87 1 0
User 35 5% 1 95 4 0 User 36 15% 6 85 9 0
User 37 6% 2 94 4 0 User 38 24% 9 76 15 0
User 39 3% 0 97 3 0 User 40 2% 0 98 2 0
User 41 3% 3 97 0 0 User 42 20% 20 80 0 0
User 43 17% 16 83 1 0 User 44 7% 6 93 1 0
User 45 5% 5 95 0 0 User 46 42% 4 58 38 0
User 47 8% 0 92 8 0 User 48 7% 2 93 5 0
User 49 1% 0 99 1 0 User 50 1% 0 99 1 0
Total 12.96% 231 4352 417 0
Summary: This table shows the results when we monitor the Top 10 Elements and set a threshold value
of 6 to determine whether a test is masqueraded or not. The overall accuracy is 12.96%.
3.4.2 Levenshtein Distance Results
A few different variation of the Levenshtein distance algorithms were experimented
with. However, none provided desirable results. Although most algorithms would be able
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to classify most of the masqueraded data, but that is because at least around 50% of the
results would return a high distance value, which represents that many edits were required.
Table 4: Levenshtein Distance Results
User Accuracy TP FP TN FN User Accuracy TP FP TN FN
User 1 40% 0 60 40 0 User 2 93% 3 7 90 0
User 3 23% 11 77 12 0 User 4 50% 2 50 48 0
User 5 71% 0 29 71 0 User 6 88% 0 12 88 0
User 7 45% 13 55 32 0 User 8 12% 0 88 12 0
User 9 52% 22 46 30 2 User 10 36% 13 64 23 0
User 11 17% 0 83 17 0 User 12 11% 6 89 5 0
User 13 32% 0 68 32 0 User 14 0% 0 100 0 0
User 15 20% 5 79 15 1 User 16 12% 7 85 5 3
User 17 73% 0 27 73 0 User 18 25% 6 75 19 0
User 19 80% 0 20 80 0 User 20 1% 0 99 1 0
User 21 59% 0 41 59 0 User 22 13% 0 87 13 0
User 23 3% 1 97 2 0 User 24 64% 21 36 43 0
User 25 32% 9 68 23 0 User 26 47% 10 50 37 3
User 27 3% 0 97 3 0 User 28 31% 3 69 28 0
User 29 17% 1 83 16 0 User 30 100% 3 0 97 0
User 31 14% 0 86 14 0 User 32 44% 0 56 44 0
User 33 61% 0 39 61 0 User 34 37% 8 59 29 4
User 35 23% 0 76 23 1 User 36 48% 6 52 42 0
User 37 34% 2 65 32 0 User 38 36% 8 63 28 1
User 39 22% 0 78 22 0 User 40 23% 0 77 23 0
User 41 6% 3 94 3 0 User 42 25% 11 66 14 9
User 43 38% 16 62 22 0 User 44 11% 6 89 5 0
User 45 59% 5 41 54 0 User 46 73% 4 27 69 0
User 47 30% 0 70 30 0 User 48 47% 2 53 45 0
User 49 3% 0 97 3 0 User 50 15% 0 85 15 0
Total 35.98% 207 3177 1592 24
Summary: The Levenshtein distance provides an increase in the overall accuracy. It is able to detect
more True Negatives; however, the trade-off is missing more masqueraded data.
In Table 4, the overall accuracy in detecting masqueraded data is below 50% for around
90% of the users. User 14 did not contain any masqueraded data, yet the tests all resulted
in being classified as masqueraded. Other cases where the number of masqueraded tests
amounted to around 70% or above, would generally catch all, if not most, of the masqueraded
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test sequences; however, those user’s results show a high percentage of false alarms.
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CHAPTER 4
Hidden Markov Models
This chapter will go over some basic information about hidden Markov models. More
in-depth details can be found in Stamp’s article [5].
4.1 Hidden Markov Models
A hidden Markov model is a tool for representing probability distributions over sequences
of observations [9]. There are two properties that define the hidden Markov model:
∙ First, the model assumes that an observation at a particular time t was generated by
some process whose state 𝑆𝑡 is hidden from the observer.
∙ Second, the model assumes that the state of this hidden process satisfies the Markov
property.
The Markov property states that given the value of 𝑆𝑡−1, the current state 𝑆𝑡 is indepen-
dent of all the states prior to t - 1 [9]. In simpler terms, we can consider the hidden Markov
model as a state graph. In Figure 5, the nodes are the states observed at a particular time,
and the edges show the probability of going to another state. The edges seen in the graph
form the transition probability matrix A.
Although we cannot directly see what exactly the state belongs to, we can observe
the behavior of the state. Using the Schonlau data set as an example, we can observe the
sequence of commands a particular user issues and the frequency of using that command to
determine the observation sequence matrix B. This observation sequence matrix allows us to
contain the probabilities of all the possible observations within a state. One last matrix is
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Figure 5: Markov State Graph [5]
needed to kick start the Hidden Markov Model, which is the initial state distribution matrix
𝜋. The three matrices, A, B, and 𝜋 define an HMM.
In this project, we decide to use the HMM with K-means learning and compute the
distance using the Estimater, which utilizes the Java HMM (JAHMM) library [10].
4.1.1 K-Means Learning
The K-means learning uses a set of data points where each data point is a vector x of
n numbers. A vector x may contain values that we want to try and classify. For example, if
we want to prioritize a task, we might have:
𝑥𝑖 = (difficulty of task i, severity of task i)
The K in K-means represents the number of clusters. We want to determine a set of K
clusters for our set of data points. We assume there is a distance function d(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗) that is
defined for all pairs of data points. Each data point will belong to exactly one cluster. In
order to determine which cluster that data point belongs in, centroids need to be computed.
These centroids determine the clusters, and we compute the distance between a data point
and a centroid to determine which cluster the data point belongs to.
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4.1.2 Smoothing
Smoothing is a mathematical technique that removes the excess data variability while
maintaining a correct appraisal [25]. K-means learning gives us an HMM that would compute
probabilities on the data read in from the observation sequences; however, it will not cover the
probability distribution of unseen sequences. By using the smoothing process, we smooth the
HMM created from K-means learning so that all sequences can occur with some probability.
4.1.3 Estimater
The Estimator is a Java jar file that computes the probability of the test data sequence
to a training HMM. The code utilizes the JAHMM library, by using the library’s observation
sequence readers. The Estimater reads in a test data sequence, then computes for each
command in the test data sequence the likelihood in which it is seen in the training HMM.
This number will be very small and so a natural log of that value is used to produce a
probability. We then use this probability to determine the optimal threshold and bias in the
threshold-based HMM approach and dueling-HMM approach.
In Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, we will discuss more details about the threshold-based
HMM approach and dueling-HMM approach.
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CHAPTER 5
Threshold-Based HMM Approach
This chapter will discuss the threshold-based HMM approach.
5.1 Threshold-based HMM Implementation
Before using a dueling-HMM approach to do masquerade detection, we first need to
compute how effectively a threshold-based HMM approach is for masquerade detection.
Although past research has shown that a threshold-based HMM approach is effective in
masquerade detection [28] [29] [9], we would still like to verify that it is a viable approach in
this project. For this experiment, we only use a threshold-based HMM benign-only approach.
The lack of masquerade data to use as training HMMs makes us come to the conclusion that
it would not be worthwhile to try doing a threshold-based HMM masquerade-only approach.
5.1.1 Threshold-Based General Implementation Scheme
This section discusses the general implementation approach that uses a combination of
different scripts written in various scripting languages. Figure 6 graphically displays the flow
of the threshold-based HMM approach. We utilize the Java HMM library (JAHMM) to create
the training HMMs by using the k-means learning option. Then we call a smoothing script
to smooth the training HMMs so that the training HMMs cover the probability distribution
of unseen sequences, so that the training HMMs would not have any "NaN" results. We then
use the Estimater to compute the probability between the test data sequence to the training
HMMs. Once all the probabilities have been computed, we translate the probabilities using
a threshold value to determine whether the test sequence is masqueraded or not.
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Figure 6: General Implementation Scheme Flow
5.1.2 Threshold-Based HMM Testing
For this experiment, we are verifying that we can correctly identify each user’s test
sequences as masqueraded or not masqueraded. First, we set up the files to use in our exper-
iment. Each user has a training sequence file that contains 5,000 lines of Linux commands
that are classified as benign. We then split the remaining 10,000 lines into 100 files, each
containing 100 lines of Linux command, to be our test sequence files. Afterwards, we asso-
ciate each Linux command to an integer value, and convert the sequence files into a sequence
of integer values so that it is compatible with the JAHMM library we use to generate our
training HMMs.
Once the files are all set up, we follow the implementation scheme in Section 5.1.1 to
generate our results in Section 5.2.
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When we compute the results to determine whether a test data sequence is masqueraded
or not masqueraded, we must consider a threshold 𝜖. If probability, p, is less than equal to
the threshold, 𝜖, we consider that test data sequence to be non-masqueraded. Otherwise,
if probability, p, is greater than the threshold, 𝜖, we consider that test data sequence to be
masqueraded. Adjusting the threshold value, we are able to produce results with an overall
accuracy of 95.38%, which captures all the non-masqueraded test data.
5.2 Threshold-base HMM results
Table 5 displays the results from the threshold-based HMM benign-only approach.
Through trial and error in adjusting the threshold, we are able to improve the accuracy
of each user. The trade-off is that as the threshold increases, the false positives decrease,
while the amount of false negatives increase. For example, User 9 and User 43, we were able
to get an accuracy of around the 70 percentile; however, the cost was letting through the
majority of the masqueraded test data sequences.
Figure 7 displays the receiver operating characteristic curve (ROC) for the threshold-
based HMM approach. We see that with a threshold-based HMM approach, we are able to
produce more of a bell curve than compared to Schonlau’s ROC, Figure 8.
Table 6 shows the results of using a threshold with increments of 0.5. For the full table
with the threshold incrementing by 0.1 see Table B.15 in Appendix B. Looking at Table 6,
we see that with a threshold of around 6.0, the false positive rate drops to less than 10%,
while the false negative rate increase to 52%. This trade-off, however, increases the accuracy
of our results. Eventually, with a threshold of 14.0 and greater, we get a false positive rate
of 0%, but let through 100% of the masqueraded data to get a high accuracy of around 95%.
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Table 5: Benign-Only Threshold-Based HMM Results
User Accuracy TP FP TN FN User Accuracy TP FP TN FN
User 1 97% 0 3 97 0 User 2 97% 1 1 96 2
User 3 90% 3 2 87 8 User 4 96% 1 3 95 1
User 5 94% 0 6 94 0 User 6 95% 0 5 95 0
User 7 86% 5 6 81 8 User 8 90% 0 10 90 0
User 9 73% 5 8 68 19 User 10 81% 13 19 68 0
User 11 93% 0 7 93 0 User 12 76% 0 18 76 6
User 13 66% 0 34 66 0 User 14 96% 0 4 96 0
User 15 80% 2 16 78 4 User 16 35% 4 59 31 6
User 17 96% 0 4 96 0 User 18 90% 4 8 86 2
User 19 97% 0 3 97 0 User 20 78% 0 22 78 0
User 21 78% 0 22 78 0 User 22 96% 0 4 96 0
User 23 98% 1 2 97 0 User 24 96% 20 3 76 1
User 25 88% 1 4 87 8 User 26 84% 6 9 78 7
User 27 91% 0 9 91 0 User 28 92% 1 6 91 2
User 29 82% 0 17 82 1 User 30 99% 3 1 96 0
User 31 98% 0 2 98 0 User 32 99% 0 1 99 0
User 33 80% 0 20 80 0 User 34 85% 3 6 82 9
User 35 94% 0 5 94 1 User 36 92% 5 7 87 1
User 37 91% 0 7 91 2 User 38 88% 5 8 83 4
User 39 84% 0 16 84 0 User 40 89% 0 11 89 0
User 41 92% 1 6 91 2 User 42 70% 11 21 59 9
User 43 79% 1 6 78 15 User 44 97% 6 3 91 0
User 45 83% 1 13 82 4 User 46 100% 4 0 96 0
User 47 89% 0 11 89 0 User 48 96% 2 4 94 0
User 49 91% 0 9 91 0 User 50 95% 0 5 95 0
Total 88.04% 109 476 4293 122
Summary: This shows the breakdown for a threshold value of 6 where we start to see lower amounts of
false positives, with higher false negatives for some users.
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Figure 7: Threshold ROC Plot
27
Figure 8: Schonlau ROC Plot [27]
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Table 6: Benign-Only Threshold-Based HMM Threshold Results
Threshold False Positives False Positive (%) False Negative False Negative (%) Accuracy
1.0 4609/4769 96.64% 0/231 0.0% 7.82%
1.5 4384/4769 91.93% 1/231 0.43% 12.3%
2.0 4004/4769 83.96% 8/231 3.46% 19.76%
2.5 3560/4769 74.65% 16/231 6.93% 28.48%
3.0 2979/4769 62.47% 29/231 12.55% 39.84%
3.5 2368/4769 49.65% 44/231 19.05% 51.76%
4.0 1767/4769 37.05% 57/231 24.68% 63.52%
4.5 1287/4769 26.99% 69/231 29.87% 72.88%
5.0 899/4769 18.85% 92/231 39.83% 80.18%
5.5 628/4769 13.17% 106/231 45.89% 85.32%
6.0 476/4769 9.98% 122/231 52.81% 88.04%
6.5 370/4769 7.76% 124/231 53.68% 90.12%
7.0 292/4769 6.12% 130/231 56.28% 91.56%
7.5 255/4769 5.35% 139/231 60.17% 92.12%
8.0 220/4769 4.61% 145/231 62.77% 92.7%
8.5 220/4769 4.61% 145/231 62.77% 92.7%
9.0 179/4769 3.75% 146/231 63.2% 93.5%
9.6 179/4769 3.75% 146/231 63.2% 93.5%
10.0 179/4769 3.75% 146/231 63.2% 93.5%
11.0 179/4769 3.75% 146/231 63.2% 93.5%
12.0 179/4769 3.75% 146/231 63.2% 93.5%
13.0 179/4769 3.75% 146/231 63.2% 93.5%
14.0 0/4769 0.0% 231/231 100.0% 95.38%
15.0 0/4769 0.0% 231/231 100.0% 95.38%
Summary: This is a snippet showing the False Positive Rate, False Negative Rate, and the overall
accuracy of the threshold-based HMM masquerade detection results using a threshold.
29
CHAPTER 6
Dueling-HMM Approach
6.1 Dueling-HMM Implementation
This section discusses the dueling-HMM approach and how we use it on the Schonlau
data set for masquerade detection and user identification.
The dueling-HMM approach utilizes multiple HMMs to try to classify which user the
test sequence resembles and whether or not it is masqueraded as that user or not. In order for
this approach to provide accurate results, the data used for training the multiple HMMs must
be accurate and have a sufficient amount of data. Not all users contain masqueraded data
in their subsequent test sequences in the Schonlau data set. The following sections discusses
the two different experiments, detecting masqueraded data and user classification, and the
workaround used to cover for the masqueraded HMMs when there is not any masqueraded
data for a particular user.
This approach follows has a similar flow as the implementation scheme discussed in
the threshold-based HMM approach in Section 5.1.1. Before using dueling-HMMs for user
classification, we need to first verify that the approach is viable for masquerade detection.
6.1.1 Dueling-HMM: Detecting Masqueraded Data Implementation
For this experiment, we are verifying that we can correctly identify each user’s test data
sequences as masqueraded or not masqueraded. We create the training HMMs using the
same approach discussed in the General Implementation Scheme in Section 5.1.1. However,
each user would have two training HMMs, one non-masqueraded HMM and one masqueraded
HMM, and 100 test data sequences. To compensate for the lack of masqueraded data to use
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as the masqueraded training HMM, we decide to use a "fifty-fold" cross validation technique
to create a masqueraded training HMM for each user.
Not every user has masqueraded test data. The users that do have masqueraded test
data, the amount of masqueraded test data varies for each of those users. For the users
that don’t have any masqueraded data to use as training, we combine all the masqueraded
test data from all the users to create a masqueraded HMM out of those masqueraded data.
For the users that do contain masqueraded data, it would not make sense to use that user’s
masqueraded test data as part of the masqueraded training data. Therefore, we apply the
cross-validation technique and create a masqueraded training HMM that combines all the
masqueraded test data from all the other users, except for the user that we are creating the
masqueraded training HMM for.
To try and improve the results obtained from the dueling-HMM approach, we introduce
a bias. To refine the dueling-HMM approach for masquerade detection, we want to adjust
the false positive:false negative ratio of our results by introducing a bias to the approach [11].
Figure 9 graphically provides the flow of the dueling-HMM masquerade detection flow.
The bias, ø, in this experiment that we adjust to refine our results is the difference,
d, between the probabilities computed between the 𝑝1, probability between test data se-
quence and benign-only training HMM, and 𝑝2, probability between test data sequence and
masquerade-only training HMM. If the difference, d, is less than equal to the bias, ø, we con-
sider that test data sequence to be non-masqueraded. Otherwise, if distance, d, is greater
than the threshold, ø, we consider that test data sequence to be masqueraded. Adjusting
the bias value, we are able to produce results with an overall accuracy 95.34%.
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Figure 9: Dueling-HMM Masquerade Detection Flow
6.2 Dueling-HMM: User Classification Implementation
For the user classification experiment, we are trying to verify if we can correctly classify
which user the test data belongs to. For this approach. we also create the training HMMs
using the approach discussed in the implementation scheme in Section 5.1.1. In this dueling-
HMM user classification approach, we decide not to use the masqueraded test data or create
training HMMs from the masqueraded data, because whether or not the test data we use is
masqueraded as a particular user in this experiment is irrelevant.
This approach follows similarly to the threshold-based HMM benign-only approach, in
that we only use the 50 benign-only training data for the 50 training HMMs. The differ-
ence though is how we go about computing the probabilities. For the threshold-based HMM
benign-only approach, we only compute the probabilities of the 100 test data sequences to
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one training HMM, it’s corresponding user’s training HMM. For the dueling-HMM masquer-
ade detection approach, we computed the probabilities of the 100 test data sequences to
two training HMM, it’s corresponding user’s benign training HMM and the cross-validated
masqueraded training HMM. For this approach, we are testing every single non-masqueraded
test data sequence to every single training HMM. Figure 10 graphically provides the flow of
the dueling-HMM user classification flow.
Figure 10: Dueling-HMM User Classification Flow
So in total, we have 4769 non-masqueraded test sequences. Each of those test sequences
would have to compute the probabilities between all 50 training HMMs. We then find the
lowest probability the test sequence computed against and classify the test data sequence to
that training HMM.
33
To try and improve the results obtained from the dueling-HMM user classification ap-
proach, we introduce a confidence factor. To compute the confidence factor, for each user, we
remove the last 1000 lines of Linux commands from the training data and split them into 10
blocks of data sequences consisting of 100 commands each. We then generate the smoothed
benign training HMM for each user using the remaining 4000 lines of Linux commands from
the training data. Using the Estimater, we compute the probabilities of the 10 blocks that
we split from the training data to the benign training HMM. These 10 probabilities are the
score samples for that particular user.
Following the approach for dueling-HMM user classification, we compute the probabili-
ties for all the benign test data sequences. To determine which user the test data sequence
belongs to we compute the confidence factor for all 50 probabilities for each test sequence.
Each user has N different score samples. In our experiment we compute 10 score samples.
Now given some unknown user’s data, the test data sequences, we obtain the probability, x,
for this sequence to a particular HMM. If x is closer to 0 than n of the N scores from the
score samples, then we can say that the confidence factor for this data matching this user is
n / N.
6.3 Dueling-HMM Testing
The dueling-HMM approach has a similar setup as the threshold-based HMM approach.
However, instead of using only one training HMM, we have two training HMMs, one for
benign data and one consisting of masqueraded data from all the users using the "fifty-fold"
cross validation technique. We use the "fifty-fold" cross validation technique, because not all
users contain masquerade data or have enough masquerade data to use as a test data. So with
2 training HMMs and 100 test data sequences, we compute the probabilities between each
test data sequence to the two training HMMs. This would produce 50 files, each containing
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200 probabilities, 100 to the benign HMM and 100 to the masqueraded HMM. We then
compare the two values obtained, the smaller of the two values would determine whether
the test data sequence is masqueraded or not. The overall accuracy obtained averaged to
be about 81.96%. Though the overall averages came to around a 8% decrease from the
threshold-based HMM approach with a threshold value of 6, the dueling-HMM approach
had a trade-off of higher false positives while detecting slightly more masqueraded data.
We then introduce the bias to see if we can further improve the accuracy. We determine
whether a test data sequence is masqueraded or not by comparing the difference between the
two probabilities computed and observe whether it is less than the bias we introduce. With
the introduction of the bias, we are able to achieve a maximum overall accuracy of about
95%, which is about the same as when we introduce the threshold in the threshold-based
HMM approach.
With the dueling-HMM approach, we also experimented with user classification. We
did this experiment only with the benign data, because we are only trying to see if this
approach can correctly classify which test data sequence belong to which user. So we would
have around 50 training HMMs, one for each user using the user’s training data, and the
benign-only test data sequence, which is around 4769 test sequences. We then compute the
distance of each test data sequence to the 50 training HMMs. Each test data sequence would
have 50 distances associated with it. The lowest value would determine which user that test
data sequence would classify as. The overall accuracy obtained was 27.18%.
We introduce a confidence factor to the dueling-HMM user classification approach to see
if we can improve the results. The results obtained was an overall accuracy of 14.52%. The
low overall accuracy is due to the fact that there were many ties for the confidence factor,
so we could not clearly distinguish the user the test data sequence belongs to.
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6.4 Dueling-HMM Results
This section discusses the results obtained from the dueling-HMM approach for mas-
querade detection and user classification.
6.4.1 Dueling-HMM Masquerade Detection Results
Table 7 breaks down the statistics for each user using the dueling-HMM approach with-
out introducing a bias.
Compared to the threshold-based HMM approach with a threshold value of 6, we see
an overall decrease in the accuracy using the dueling-HMM approach. If we look at the
true positive column (TP), we see that the dueling-HMM results is able to classify a higher
amount than the threshold-based HMM result. Although we get an slight decrease in the
overall accuracy using the dueling-HMM approach, the tradeoff is that the dueling-HMM
approach is able to be obtain more true positives and less amounts of false negatives; however,
with higher amounts of false positives than the threshold-based HMM benign-only approach.
6.4.2 Dueling-HMM Bias Results
Figure 11 graphically shows the ROC curve for the dueling-HMM approach using the
bias.
Table 8 shows the results of using a bias with increments of 0.5. For the full table with
the bias incrementing by 0.1 see Table C.17 in Appendix C. Looking at Table 8, we see that
with a bias of around 4.0 - 5.0, the false positive rate drops to less than 10.0%, while the
false negative rate increase to about 60.0%. This trade-off, however, increases the accuracy
of our results. Eventually, with a bias of 11.0 and greater, we get a false positive rate of
0.0%, but we let through around 100% of the masqueraded data to get a high accuracy of
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Table 7: Dueling-HMM Results
User Accuracy TP FP TN FN User Accuracy TP FP TN FN
User 1 90% 0 10 90 0 User 2 96% 3 4 93 0
User 3 90% 7 6 83 4 User 4 78% 2 22 76 0
User 5 89% 0 11 89 0 User 6 86% 0 14 86 0
User 7 79% 8 16 71 5 User 8 84% 0 16 84 0
User 9 69% 9 16 60 15 User 10 76% 13 24 63 0
User 11 82% 0 18 82 0 User 12 72% 0 22 72 6
User 13 59% 0 41 59 0 User 14 90% 0 10 90 0
User 15 71% 1 24 70 5 User 16 33% 5 62 28 5
User 17 87% 0 13 87 0 User 18 88% 5 11 83 1
User 19 85% 0 15 85 0 User 20 78% 0 22 78 0
User 21 83% 0 17 83 0 User 22 84% 0 16 84 0
User 23 95% 1 5 94 0 User 24 93% 20 6 73 1
User 25 82% 8 17 74 1 User 26 82% 6 11 76 7
User 27 89% 0 11 89 0 User 28 82% 3 18 79 0
User 29 73% 0 26 73 1 User 30 99% 3 1 96 0
User 31 93% 0 7 93 0 User 32 99% 0 1 99 0
User 33 69% 0 31 69 0 User 34 76% 3 15 73 9
User 35 92% 0 7 92 1 User 36 89% 6 11 83 0
User 37 80% 0 18 80 2 User 38 84% 5 12 79 4
User 39 76% 0 24 76 0 User 40 85% 0 15 85 0
User 41 80% 2 19 78 1 User 42 69% 11 22 58 9
User 43 73% 2 13 71 14 User 44 90% 6 10 84 0
User 45 77% 1 19 76 4 User 46 96% 4 4 92 0
User 47 74% 0 26 74 0 User 48 84% 2 16 82 0
User 49 85% 0 15 85 0 User 50 83% 0 17 83 0
Total 81.96% 136 807 3962 95
Summary: Using the dueling-HMM approach, we see a slight decrease in the overall accuracy, 81.96%.
However, we see lower amounts of false negatives than in the threshold-based HMM approach.
around 95%.
6.4.3 Dueling-HMM User Classification Results
Table 9 displays the results of the dueling-HMM user classification experiment. The
table consists of the amount of correctly classified test data sequence (Match), the total
number of test data sequences associated with each user (Total), and the accuracy of the
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Table 8: Dueling-HMM Bias Result
Bias False Positives False Positive (%) False Negative False Negative (%) Accuracy
1.0 3670/4769 76.96% 60/231 25.97% 25.4%
1.5 3088/4769 64.75% 78/231 33.77% 36.68%
2.0 2445/4769 51.27% 100/231 43.29% 49.1%
2.5 1898/4769 39.8% 122/231 52.81% 59.6%
3.0 1313/4769 27.53% 133/231 57.58% 71.08%
3.5 1013/4769 21.24% 136/231 58.87% 77.02%
4.0 630/4769 13.21% 144/231 62.34% 84.52%
4.5 440/4769 9.23% 147/231 63.64% 88.26%
5.0 303/4769 6.35% 148/231 64.07% 90.98%
5.5 202/4769 4.24% 148/231 64.07% 93.0%
6.0 184/4769 3.86% 149/231 64.5% 93.34%
6.5 179/4769 3.75% 149/231 64.5% 93.44%
7.0 173/4769 3.63% 149/231 64.5% 93.56%
7.5 140/4769 2.94% 151/231 65.37% 94.18%
8.0 101/4769 2.12% 169/231 73.16% 94.6%
8.5 63/4769 1.32% 178/231 77.06% 95.18%
9.0 33/4769 0.69% 192/231 83.12% 95.5%
9.5 11/4769 0.23% 222/231 96.1% 95.34%
10.0 6/4769 0.13% 227/231 98.27% 95.34%
11.0 0/4769 0.0% 230/231 99.57% 95.4%
12.0 0/4769 0.0% 231/231 100.0% 95.38%
Summary: This is a snippet showing the False Positive Rate, False Negative Rate, and the overall
accuracy of the dueling-HMM masquerade detection results using a bias.
test data sequences correctly classified (Accuracy).
It is interesting to note that the dueling-HMM approach does not produce very desirable
results for user classification as shown in Table 9. It seems to have trouble distinguishing
which test data sequence belongs to which user, only achieving an overall accuracy of 27.18%.
6.4.4 Dueling-HMM User Classification Confidence Factor Results
Table 10 displays the results of the dueling-HMM user classification approach using
confidence factors. The extra column, Ties, shows the number of test sequences in which
one of the ties for the highest confidence factor was it’s corresponding user. From Table 10,
we see that using confidence factors results in many ties, indicating that the approach has
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Figure 11: Dueling-HMM Bias ROC Plot
difficulty in clearly distinguishing the test data sequences to it’s corresponding user.
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Table 9: User Classification Results
User Match Total Accuracy User Match Total Accuracy
User 1 28 100 28.0% User 2 56 97 57.73%
User 3 42 89 47.19% User 4 25 98 25.51%
User 5 17 100 17.0% User 6 45 100 45.0%
User 7 10 87 11.49% User 8 67 100 67.0%
User 9 27 76 35.53% User 10 22 87 25.29%
User 11 4 100 4.0% User 12 23 94 24.47%
User 13 31 100 31.0% User 14 12 100 12.0%
User 15 4 94 4.26% User 16 10 90 11.11%
User 17 15 100 15.0% User 18 66 94 70.21%
User 19 0 100 0.0% User 20 0 100 0.0%
User 21 42 100 42.0% User 22 19 100 19.0%
User 23 3 99 3.03% User 24 17 79 21.52%
User 25 21 91 23.08% User 26 31 87 35.63%
User 27 14 100 14.0% User 28 18 97 18.56%
User 29 5 99 5.05% User 30 96 97 98.97%
User 31 31 100 31.0% User 32 53 100 53.0%
User 33 12 100 12.0% User 34 5 88 5.68%
User 35 62 99 62.63% User 36 59 94 62.77%
User 37 36 98 36.73% User 38 12 91 13.19%
User 39 12 100 12.0% User 40 26 100 26.0%
User 41 0 97 0.0% User 42 12 80 15.0%
User 43 12 84 14.29% User 44 17 94 18.09%
User 45 47 95 49.47% User 46 50 96 52.08%
User 47 49 100 49.0% User 48 25 98 25.51%
User 49 8 100 8.0% User 50 0 100 0.0%
Total 1298 4769 27.18%
Summary: The dueling-HMM provides quite low accuracy in trying to classify which user a test data
sequence belongs.
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Table 10: User Classification Confidence Factor Results
User Match Ties Total Accuracy User Match Ties Total Accuracy
User 1 0 28 100 0.0% User 2 22 0 97 22.68%
User 3 20 33 89 22.47% User 4 0 21 98 0.0%
User 5 0 17 100 0.0% User 6 0 17 100 0.0%
User 7 0 10 87 0.0% User 8 67 0 100 67.0%
User 9 21 0 76 27.63% User 10 24 12 87 27.59%
User 11 16 14 100 16.0% User 12 1 41 94 1.06%
User 13 9 22 100 9.0% User 14 0 12 100 0.0%
User 15 2 1 94 2.13% User 16 6 0 90 6.67%
User 17 16 0 100 16.0% User 18 66 0 94 70.21%
User 19 6 16 100 6.0% User 20 5 7 100 5.0%
User 21 0 25 100 0.0% User 22 18 10 100 18.0%
User 23 5 47 99 5.05% User 24 11 11 79 13.92%
User 25 15 0 91 16.48% User 26 5 24 87 5.75%
User 27 6 3 100 6.0% User 28 9 24 97 9.28%
User 29 0 13 99 0.0% User 30 67 0 97 69.07%
User 31 22 9 100 22.0% User 32 0 17 100 0.0%
User 33 17 4 100 17.0% User 34 9 29 88 10.23%
User 35 6 54 99 6.06% User 36 14 18 94 14.89%
User 37 32 0 98 32.65% User 38 6 14 91 6.59%
User 39 15 9 100 15.0% User 40 8 10 100 8.0%
User 41 9 11 97 9.28% User 42 5 2 80 6.25%
User 43 0 40 84 0.0% User 44 0 10 94 0.0%
User 45 30 1 95 31.58% User 46 0 19 96 0.0%
User 47 27 0 100 27.0% User 48 28 4 98 28.57%
User 49 34 27 100 34.0% User 50 14 2 100 14.0%
Total 693 688 4769 14.52%
Summary: Using the Confidence Factor, we obtain an even lower score due to the fact that there are
many ties; hence, we are unable to clearly distinguish which user the test sequence belongs to.
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusion
Masqueraders are users that try to impersonate their victims. In this research, we
explore the heavy hitter approach, threshold-based HMM approach, and dueling-HMM ap-
proach to see how effectively these approaches can detect masqueraders using the Schonlau
data set. We conclude that the heavy hitter approach is not a very viable approach to do
masquerade detection. On the other hand, the threshold-based HMM approach and dueling-
HMM approach produce desirable results through introducing a threshold and bias.
The heavy hitter approach that utilizes the top k elements of a sequence of data did not
provide an adequate representation of a user. By trying to see how many of the test data
sequences’ top k elements matches that of the top k elements of the training data sequence
provided insignificant data to determine whether the test sequence is masqueraded or not.
Applying the Levenshtein distance to compute the similarity between the top k elements of
the training sequence and test sequence showed a slight increase in the results; however, the
results were still far from satisfactory with 90% of the users getting below an overall accuracy
of 50%. While able to capture most of the masqueraded data, users would be flooded with
false alarms.
The threshold-based HMM proves to be an adequate approach to doing masquerade
detection as we have verified in our project to the results seen in past researches. We obtain
an overall accuracy of 95.38% with a threshold value of 14.0 or higher. To see if the accuracy
could be further improved, we experiment with the the dueling-HMM approach.
Using the dueling-HMM approach, we also obtain an overall accuracy of 95.38% with
a bias value of 9.5 and higher. We see that in both threshold-based HMM approach and
42
dueling-HMM approach, we are able to capture all the non-masqueraded test data sequences,
while 100% of the masqueraded test data sequences are not captured, yet still resulting in
an overall accuracy of 95.38%.
We also experimented with classifying users with the dueling-HMM approach. Contrary
to the results we see for using the dueling-HMM approach for masquerade detection, we
see an overall accuracy of 27.18% for the dueling-HMM approach for user classification.
Furthermore, when we introduce the confidence factors into the dueling-HMM approach for
user classification, we see an overall accuracy of 14.52% due to the fact that the dueling-
HMM approach has difficulty it clearly distinguishing which test data sequence belongs to
which user because of the many ties when computing the confidence factor. This may also
be due to the fact that we reduced the amount of training data used to generate the HMM
so that we can obtain score samples to compute the confidence factor.
In this project, we create HMMs from the Schonlau training data for the threshold-based
HMM approach and dueling-HMM approach. In M. Stamp and L. Huang’s article [5], we
see that using a profile hidden Markov model (PHMM) has the advantage over HMMs using
a limited training data set, where the PHMM’s feature is utilizing the order in which a user
issues commands. To see if we can further improve the dueling-HMM approach, it would be
interesting to see if integrating PHMMs would improve the accuracy, using a limited training
data set and with the Schonlau data set.
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APPENDIX A
Heavy Hitter Space Saving Results
Table A.11: HH - Top 10 - 20%
User Percentage TP FP TN FN User Percentage TP FP TN FN
User 1 79% 0 21 79 0 User 2 98% 3 2 95 0
User 3 91% 8 6 83 3 User 4 46% 2 54 44 0
User 5 95% 0 5 95 0 User 6 93% 0 7 93 0
User 7 71% 12 28 59 1 User 8 24% 0 76 24 0
User 9 82% 17 12 65 6 User 10 51% 13 49 38 0
User 11 69% 0 31 69 0 User 12 40% 0 55 40 5
User 13 62% 0 38 62 0 User 14 28% 0 72 28 0
User 15 30% 5 69 25 1 User 16 38% 8 60 30 2
User 17 82% 0 18 82 0 User 18 47% 5 52 42 1
User 19 95% 0 5 95 0 User 20 53% 0 47 53 0
User 21 90% 0 10 90 0 User 22 42% 0 58 42 0
User 23 62% 1 38 61 0 User 24 74% 20 25 54 1
User 25 39% 9 61 30 0 User 26 66% 5 27 61 7
User 27 24% 0 76 24 0 User 28 62% 3 38 59 0
User 29 35% 1 65 34 0 User 30 38% 3 62 35 0
User 31 60% 0 40 60 0 User 32 72% 0 28 72 0
User 33 97% 0 3 97 0 User 34 49% 9 49 40 2
User 35 89% 1 11 88 0 User 36 82% 3 15 79 3
User 37 79% 1 20 78 1 User 38 90% 5 8 85 2
User 39 76% 0 24 76 0 User 40 82% 0 18 82 0
User 41 24% 3 76 21 0 User 42 61% 7 27 54 12
User 43 80% 6 11 74 9 User 44 83% 5 17 78 0
User 45 84% 2 14 82 2 User 46 96% 4 4 92 0
User 47 80% 0 20 80 0 User 48 92% 2 8 90 0
User 49 55% 0 45 55 0 User 50 76% 0 24 76 0
Total 66.26% 163 1629 3150 58
Summary: This table shows the results when we monitor the Top 10 Elements and set a threshold value
of 2 to determine whether a test is masqueraded or not. The overall accuracy is 66.26%.
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Table A.12: HH - Top 10 - 30%
User Percentage TP FP TN FN User Percentage TP FP TN FN
User 1 60% 0 40 60 0 User 2 96% 3 4 93 0
User 3 83% 10 16 73 1 User 4 29% 2 71 27 0
User 5 75% 0 25 75 0 User 6 90% 0 10 90 0
User 7 34% 12 65 22 1 User 8 11% 0 89 11 0
User 9 64% 24 36 40 0 User 10 42% 13 58 29 0
User 11 48% 0 52 48 0 User 12 19% 1 76 18 5
User 13 27% 0 73 27 0 User 14 9% 0 91 9 0
User 15 24% 5 75 19 1 User 16 25% 10 75 15 0
User 17 79% 0 21 79 0 User 18 24% 5 75 19 1
User 19 86% 0 14 86 0 User 20 17% 0 83 17 0
User 21 83% 0 17 83 0 User 22 26% 0 74 26 0
User 23 11% 1 89 10 0 User 24 48% 21 52 27 0
User 25 18% 9 82 9 0 User 26 39% 11 59 28 2
User 27 7% 0 93 7 0 User 28 37% 3 63 34 0
User 29 9% 1 91 8 0 User 30 34% 3 66 31 0
User 31 36% 0 64 36 0 User 32 63% 0 37 63 0
User 33 93% 0 7 93 0 User 34 30% 11 69 19 1
User 35 29% 1 71 28 0 User 36 56% 4 42 52 2
User 37 51% 1 48 50 1 User 38 74% 5 24 69 2
User 39 57% 0 43 57 0 User 40 54% 0 46 54 0
User 41 17% 3 82 14 0 User 42 38% 14 55 24 6
User 43 61% 14 37 47 2 User 44 61% 5 39 56 0
User 45 60% 4 40 56 0 User 46 87% 4 13 83 0
User 47 53% 0 47 53 0 User 48 66% 2 34 64 0
User 49 31% 0 69 31 0 User 50 43% 0 57 43 0
Total 46.28% 202 2661 2112 25
Summary: This table shows the results when we monitor the Top 10 Elements and set a threshold value
of 3 to determine whether a test is masqueraded or not. The overall accuracy is 46.28%.
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Table A.13: HH - Top 10 - 40%
User Percentage TP FP TN FN User Percentage TP FP TN FN
User 1 40% 0 60 40 0 User 2 86% 3 14 83 0
User 3 68% 11 32 57 0 User 4 10% 2 90 8 0
User 5 53% 0 47 53 0 User 6 81% 0 19 81 0
User 7 20% 13 80 7 0 User 8 2% 0 98 2 0
User 9 44% 24 56 20 0 User 10 37% 13 63 24 0
User 11 30% 0 70 30 0 User 12 14% 4 85 10 1
User 13 10% 0 90 10 0 User 14 0% 0 100 0 0
User 15 18% 5 81 13 1 User 16 14% 10 86 4 0
User 17 77% 0 23 77 0 User 18 10% 6 90 4 0
User 19 80% 0 20 80 0 User 20 3% 0 97 3 0
User 21 74% 0 26 74 0 User 22 14% 0 86 14 0
User 23 1% 1 99 0 0 User 24 31% 21 69 10 0
User 25 12% 9 88 3 0 User 26 19% 12 80 7 1
User 27 1% 0 99 1 0 User 28 20% 3 80 17 0
User 29 3% 1 97 2 0 User 30 3% 3 97 0 0
User 31 11% 0 89 11 0 User 32 50% 0 50 50 0
User 33 72% 0 28 72 0 User 34 23% 12 77 11 0
User 35 21% 1 79 20 0 User 36 40% 6 60 34 0
User 37 31% 1 68 30 1 User 38 63% 7 36 56 1
User 39 34% 0 66 34 0 User 40 35% 0 65 35 0
User 41 9% 3 91 6 0 User 42 25% 17 72 8 3
User 43 36% 16 64 20 0 User 44 37% 6 63 31 0
User 45 26% 4 74 22 0 User 46 73% 4 27 69 0
User 47 33% 0 67 33 0 User 48 40% 2 60 38 0
User 49 8% 0 92 8 0 User 50 18% 0 82 18 0
Total 31.2% 220 3432 1340 8
Summary: This table shows the results when we monitor the Top 10 Elements and set a threshold value
of 4 to determine whether a test is masqueraded or not. The overall accuracy is 31.2%.
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Table A.14: HH - Top 10 - 50%
User Percentage TP FP TN FN User Percentage TP FP TN FN
User 1 21% 0 79 21 0 User 2 71% 3 29 68 0
User 3 49% 11 51 38 0 User 4 5% 2 95 3 0
User 5 21% 0 79 21 0 User 6 63% 0 37 63 0
User 7 15% 13 85 2 0 User 8 1% 0 99 1 0
User 9 33% 24 67 9 0 User 10 27% 13 73 14 0
User 11 11% 0 89 11 0 User 12 8% 5 92 3 0
User 13 2% 0 98 2 0 User 14 0% 0 100 0 0
User 15 11% 5 88 6 1 User 16 12% 10 88 2 0
User 17 65% 0 35 65 0 User 18 7% 6 93 1 0
User 19 67% 0 33 67 0 User 20 0% 0 100 0 0
User 21 64% 0 36 64 0 User 22 9% 0 91 9 0
User 23 1% 1 99 0 0 User 24 22% 21 78 1 0
User 25 11% 9 89 2 0 User 26 15% 13 85 2 0
User 27 1% 0 99 1 0 User 28 6% 3 94 3 0
User 29 1% 1 99 0 0 User 30 3% 3 97 0 0
User 31 6% 0 94 6 0 User 32 39% 0 61 39 0
User 33 56% 0 44 56 0 User 34 16% 12 84 4 0
User 35 8% 1 92 7 0 User 36 28% 6 72 22 0
User 37 15% 2 85 13 0 User 38 44% 9 55 35 0
User 39 16% 0 84 16 0 User 40 9% 0 91 9 0
User 41 4% 3 96 1 0 User 42 23% 20 77 3 0
User 43 20% 16 80 4 0 User 44 9% 6 91 3 0
User 45 14% 5 86 9 0 User 46 53% 4 47 49 0
User 47 21% 0 79 21 0 User 48 18% 2 82 16 0
User 49 2% 0 98 2 0 User 50 4% 0 96 4 0
Total 20.54% 229 3972 798 1
Summary: This table shows the results when we monitor the Top 10 Elements and set a threshold value
of 5 to determine whether a test is masqueraded or not. The overall accuracy is 20.54%.
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APPENDIX B
Threshold-Based HMM Threshold Results
Table B.15: Threshold-Based HMM Threshold Result
Threshold False Positives False Positive (%) False Negative False Negative (%) Accuracy
1.0 4609/4769 96.64% 0/231 0.0% 7.82%
1.1 4542/4769 95.24% 0/231 0.0% 9.16%
1.2 4513/4769 94.63% 0/231 0.0% 9.74%
1.3 4453/4769 93.37% 0/231 0.0% 10.94%
1.4 4438/4769 93.06% 0/231 0.0% 11.24%
1.5 4384/4769 91.93% 1/231 0.43% 12.3%
1.6 4336/4769 90.92% 1/231 0.43% 13.26%
1.7 4283/4769 89.81% 1/231 0.43% 14.32%
1.8 4207/4769 88.22% 4/231 1.73% 15.78%
1.9 4132/4769 86.64% 4/231 1.73% 17.28%
2.0 4004/4769 83.96% 8/231 3.46% 19.76%
2.1 3952/4769 82.87% 11/231 4.76% 20.74%
2.2 3859/4769 80.92% 12/231 5.19% 22.58%
2.3 3767/4769 78.99% 13/231 5.63% 24.4%
2.4 3702/4769 77.63% 13/231 5.63% 25.7%
2.5 3560/4769 74.65% 16/231 6.93% 28.48%
2.6 3459/4769 72.53% 23/231 9.96% 30.36%
2.7 3346/4769 70.16% 24/231 10.39% 32.6%
2.8 3246/4769 68.06% 27/231 11.69% 34.54%
2.9 3128/4769 65.59% 29/231 12.55% 36.86%
3.0 2979/4769 62.47% 29/231 12.55% 39.84%
3.1 2885/4769 60.49% 31/231 13.42% 41.68%
3.2 2697/4769 56.55% 35/231 15.15% 45.36%
3.3 2556/4769 53.6% 36/231 15.58% 48.16%
3.4 2456/4769 51.5% 42/231 18.18% 50.04%
3.5 2368/4769 49.65% 44/231 19.05% 51.76%
3.6 2243/4769 47.03% 47/231 20.35% 54.2%
3.7 2123/4769 44.52% 49/231 21.21% 56.56%
3.8 1985/4769 41.62% 49/231 21.21% 59.32%
3.9 1886/4769 39.55% 54/231 23.38% 61.2%
4.0 1767/4769 37.05% 57/231 24.68% 63.52%
4.1 1648/4769 34.56% 60/231 25.97% 65.84%
4.2 1539/4769 32.27% 62/231 26.84% 67.98%
4.3 1453/4769 30.47% 65/231 28.14% 69.64%
4.4 1380/4769 28.94% 65/231 28.14% 71.1%
4.5 1287/4769 26.99% 69/231 29.87% 72.88%
4.6 1226/4769 25.71% 72/231 31.17% 74.04%
4.7 1150/4769 24.11% 79/231 34.2% 75.42%
4.8 1044/4769 21.89% 83/231 35.93% 77.46%
4.9 994/4769 20.84% 89/231 38.53% 78.34%
5.0 899/4769 18.85% 92/231 39.83% 80.18%
5.1 846/4769 17.74% 95/231 41.13% 81.18%
5.2 781/4769 16.38% 99/231 42.86% 82.4%
5.3 709/4769 14.87% 105/231 45.45% 83.72%
5.4 674/4769 14.13% 105/231 45.45% 84.42%
5.5 628/4769 13.17% 106/231 45.89% 85.32%
5.6 590/4769 12.37% 111/231 48.05% 85.98%
5.7 551/4769 11.55% 121/231 52.38% 86.56%
5.8 539/4769 11.3% 121/231 52.38% 86.8%
5.9 493/4769 10.34% 122/231 52.81% 87.7%
6.0 476/4769 9.98% 122/231 52.81% 88.04%
Summary: Shows the data of the threshold in increments of 0.1. Shows how the False Positive Percent
decreasing as the False Negative Percent increases to get an overall higher accuracy.
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Table B.16: Threshold-Based HMM Threshold ResulContinuation
Threshold False Positives False Positive (%) False Negative False Negative (%) Accuracy
6.1 457/4769 9.58% 122/231 52.81% 88.42%
6.2 449/4769 9.41% 123/231 53.25% 88.56%
6.3 419/4769 8.79% 123/231 53.25% 89.16%
6.4 395/4769 8.28% 123/231 53.25% 89.64%
6.5 370/4769 7.76% 124/231 53.68% 90.12%
6.6 356/4769 7.46% 127/231 54.98% 90.34%
6.7 356/4769 7.46% 127/231 54.98% 90.34%
6.8 329/4769 6.9% 128/231 55.41% 90.86%
6.9 329/4769 6.9% 128/231 55.41% 90.86%
7.0 292/4769 6.12% 130/231 56.28% 91.56%
7.1 292/4769 6.12% 130/231 56.28% 91.56%
7.2 268/4769 5.62% 137/231 59.31% 91.9%
7.3 268/4769 5.62% 137/231 59.31% 91.9%
7.4 268/4769 5.62% 137/231 59.31% 91.9%
7.5 255/4769 5.35% 139/231 60.17% 92.12%
7.6 255/4769 5.35% 139/231 60.17% 92.12%
7.7 255/4769 5.35% 139/231 60.17% 92.12%
7.8 255/4769 5.35% 139/231 60.17% 92.12%
7.9 220/4769 4.61% 145/231 62.77% 92.7%
8.0 220/4769 4.61% 145/231 62.77% 92.7%
8.1 220/4769 4.61% 145/231 62.77% 92.7%
8.2 220/4769 4.61% 145/231 62.77% 92.7%
8.3 220/4769 4.61% 145/231 62.77% 92.7%
8.4 220/4769 4.61% 145/231 62.77% 92.7%
8.5 220/4769 4.61% 145/231 62.77% 92.7%
8.6 179/4769 3.75% 146/231 63.2% 93.5%
8.7 179/4769 3.75% 146/231 63.2% 93.5%
8.8 179/4769 3.75% 146/231 63.2% 93.5%
8.9 179/4769 3.75% 146/231 63.2% 93.5%
9.0 179/4769 3.75% 146/231 63.2% 93.5%
9.1 179/4769 3.75% 146/231 63.2% 93.5%
9.2 179/4769 3.75% 146/231 63.2% 93.5%
9.3 179/4769 3.75% 146/231 63.2% 93.5%
9.4 179/4769 3.75% 146/231 63.2% 93.5%
9.5 179/4769 3.75% 146/231 63.2% 93.5%
9.6 179/4769 3.75% 146/231 63.2% 93.5%
9.7 179/4769 3.75% 146/231 63.2% 93.5%
9.8 179/4769 3.75% 146/231 63.2% 93.5%
9.9 179/4769 3.75% 146/231 63.2% 93.5%
10.0 179/4769 3.75% 146/231 63.2% 93.5%
11.0 179/4769 3.75% 146/231 63.2% 93.5%
12.0 179/4769 3.75% 146/231 63.2% 93.5%
13.0 179/4769 3.75% 146/231 63.2% 93.5%
14.0 0/4769 0.0% 231/231 100.0% 95.38%
15.0 0/4769 0.0% 231/231 100.0% 95.38%
16.0 0/4769 0.0% 231/231 100.0% 95.38%
17.0 0/4769 0.0% 231/231 100.0% 95.38%
18.0 0/4769 0.0% 231/231 100.0% 95.38%
19.0 0/4769 0.0% 231/231 100.0% 95.38%
20.0 0/4769 0.0% 231/231 100.0% 95.38%
Summary: Shows the data of the threshold in increments of 0.1. Shows how the False Positive Percent
decreasing as the False Negative Percent increases to get an overall higher accuracy. Eventually tapering
off at around a threshold 14.0 where there are no false positives, but misses nearly all the masqueraded
data, yet still resulting in an accuracy of 95.38%.
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APPENDIX C
Dueling-HMM Bias Results
Table C.17: Dueling-HMM Bias Result
Bias False Positives False Positive (%) False Negative False Negative (%) Accuracy
1.0 3670/4769 76.96% 60/231 25.97% 25.4%
1.1 3549/4769 74.42% 61/231 26.41% 27.8%
1.2 3437/4769 72.07% 66/231 28.57% 29.94%
1.3 3330/4769 69.83% 68/231 29.44% 32.04%
1.4 3200/4769 67.1% 74/231 32.03% 34.52%
1.5 3088/4769 64.75% 78/231 33.77% 36.68%
1.6 2988/4769 62.65% 83/231 35.93% 38.58%
1.7 2895/4769 60.7% 86/231 37.23% 40.38%
1.8 2758/4769 57.83% 91/231 39.39% 43.02%
1.9 2599/4769 54.5% 95/231 41.13% 46.12%
2.0 2445/4769 51.27% 100/231 43.29% 49.1%
2.1 2315/4769 48.54% 104/231 45.02% 51.62%
2.2 2192/4769 45.96% 110/231 47.62% 53.96%
2.3 2113/4769 44.31% 115/231 49.78% 55.44%
2.4 2033/4769 42.63% 117/231 50.65% 57.0%
2.5 1898/4769 39.8% 122/231 52.81% 59.6%
2.6 1733/4769 36.34% 124/231 53.68% 62.86%
2.7 1583/4769 33.19% 131/231 56.71% 65.72%
2.8 1515/4769 31.77% 131/231 56.71% 67.08%
2.9 1410/4769 29.57% 133/231 57.58% 69.14%
3.0 1313/4769 27.53% 133/231 57.58% 71.08%
3.1 1233/4769 25.85% 134/231 58.01% 72.66%
3.2 1164/4769 24.41% 135/231 58.44% 74.02%
3.3 1099/4769 23.04% 135/231 58.44% 75.32%
3.4 1078/4769 22.6% 135/231 58.44% 75.74%
3.5 1013/4769 21.24% 136/231 58.87% 77.02%
3.6 934/4769 19.58% 140/231 60.61% 78.52%
3.7 869/4769 18.22% 140/231 60.61% 79.82%
3.8 832/4769 17.45% 141/231 61.04% 80.54%
3.9 761/4769 15.96% 144/231 62.34% 81.9%
4.0 630/4769 13.21% 144/231 62.34% 84.52%
4.1 557/4769 11.68% 146/231 63.2% 85.94%
4.2 547/4769 11.47% 146/231 63.2% 86.14%
4.3 546/4769 11.45% 146/231 63.2% 86.16%
4.4 482/4769 10.11% 146/231 63.2% 87.44%
4.5 440/4769 9.23% 147/231 63.64% 88.26%
4.6 415/4769 8.7% 147/231 63.64% 88.76%
4.7 320/4769 6.71% 148/231 64.07% 90.64%
4.8 304/4769 6.37% 148/231 64.07% 90.96%
4.9 303/4769 6.35% 148/231 64.07% 90.98%
5.0 303/4769 6.35% 148/231 64.07% 90.98%
5.1 236/4769 4.95% 148/231 64.07% 92.32%
5.2 202/4769 4.24% 148/231 64.07% 93.0%
5.3 202/4769 4.24% 148/231 64.07% 93.0%
5.4 202/4769 4.24% 148/231 64.07% 93.0%
5.5 202/4769 4.24% 148/231 64.07% 93.0%
5.6 184/4769 3.86% 148/231 64.07% 93.36%
5.7 184/4769 3.86% 149/231 64.5% 93.34%
5.8 184/4769 3.86% 149/231 64.5% 93.34%
5.9 184/4769 3.86% 149/231 64.5% 93.34%
6.0 184/4769 3.86% 149/231 64.5% 93.34%
Summary: Shows the data of the bias in increments of 0.1. Shows how the False Positive Percent decreasing
as the False Negative Percent increases to get an overall higher accuracy.
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Table C.18: Dueling-HMM Bias Result Continuation
Bias False Positives False Positive (%) False Negative False Negative (%) Accuracy
6.1 184/4769 3.86% 149/231 64.5% 93.34%
6.2 184/4769 3.86% 149/231 64.5% 93.34%
6.3 184/4769 3.86% 149/231 64.5% 93.34%
6.4 184/4769 3.86% 149/231 64.5% 93.34%
6.5 179/4769 3.75% 149/231 64.5% 93.44%
6.6 178/4769 3.73% 149/231 64.5% 93.46%
6.7 176/4769 3.69% 149/231 64.5% 93.5%
6.8 176/4769 3.69% 149/231 64.5% 93.5%
6.9 174/4769 3.65% 149/231 64.5% 93.54%
7.0 173/4769 3.63% 149/231 64.5% 93.56%
7.1 171/4769 3.59% 149/231 64.5% 93.6%
7.2 166/4769 3.48% 149/231 64.5% 93.7%
7.3 156/4769 3.27% 149/231 64.5% 93.9%
7.4 142/4769 2.98% 149/231 64.5% 94.18%
7.5 140/4769 2.94% 151/231 65.37% 94.18%
7.6 131/4769 2.75% 166/231 71.86% 94.06%
7.7 121/4769 2.54% 168/231 72.73% 94.22%
7.8 117/4769 2.45% 168/231 72.73% 94.3%
7.9 111/4769 2.33% 168/231 72.73% 94.42%
8.0 101/4769 2.12% 169/231 73.16% 94.6%
8.1 97/4769 2.03% 169/231 73.16% 94.68%
8.2 92/4769 1.93% 173/231 74.89% 94.7%
8.3 87/4769 1.82% 175/231 75.76% 94.76%
8.4 78/4769 1.64% 177/231 76.62% 94.9%
8.5 63/4769 1.32% 178/231 77.06% 95.18%
8.6 49/4769 1.03% 183/231 79.22% 95.36%
8.7 45/4769 0.94% 185/231 80.09% 95.4%
8.8 40/4769 0.84% 189/231 81.82% 95.42%
8.9 35/4769 0.73% 190/231 82.25% 95.5%
9.0 33/4769 0.69% 192/231 83.12% 95.5%
9.1 30/4769 0.63% 218/231 94.37% 95.04%
9.2 25/4769 0.52% 218/231 94.37% 95.14%
9.3 16/4769 0.34% 220/231 95.24% 95.28%
9.4 11/4769 0.23% 221/231 95.67% 95.36%
9.5 11/4769 0.23% 222/231 96.1% 95.34%
9.6 10/4769 0.21% 222/231 96.1% 95.36%
9.7 10/4769 0.21% 224/231 96.97% 95.32%
9.8 7/4769 0.15% 225/231 97.4% 95.36%
9.9 6/4769 0.13% 225/231 97.4% 95.38%
10.0 6/4769 0.13% 227/231 98.27% 95.34%
11.0 0/4769 0.0% 230/231 99.57% 95.4%
12.0 0/4769 0.0% 231/231 100.0% 95.38%
13.0 0/4769 0.0% 231/231 100.0% 95.38%
14.0 0/4769 0.0% 231/231 100.0% 95.38%
15.0 0/4769 0.0% 231/231 100.0% 95.38%
16.0 0/4769 0.0% 231/231 100.0% 95.38%
17.0 0/4769 0.0% 231/231 100.0% 95.38%
18.0 0/4769 0.0% 231/231 100.0% 95.38%
19.0 0/4769 0.0% 231/231 100.0% 95.38%
20.0 0/4769 0.0% 231/231 100.0% 95.38%
Summary: Shows the data of the bias in increments of 0.1. Shows how the False Positive Percent decreasing
as the False Negative Percent increases to get an overall higher accuracy. Eventually tapering off at around
a bias of 10 - 11 where there are no false positives, but misses nearly all the masqueraded data, yet still
resulting in an accuracy of 95.38%.
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